Contemporary physics, with two Einstein’s theories and with Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy are frequently interpreted as a removal of the causality from physics. We argue that this is wrong. There are no indications in physics, either classical or quantum, that physical laws are indeterministic, on the ontological level. On the other hand, both classical and quantum physics are, practically, indeterministic on the epistemic level: there are no means for us to predict the detailed future of the world. Additionally, essentially all (...) physical principles, including the arrow of time and the conservation of energy could be, hypothetically, violated. However, in contrast to Hume’s skepticism, we have no experimental evidence that the causality can be removed or even “hung on” in any case. The text contains some didactical-like issues, as well. (shrink)

The speech act of inquiry is generally treated as a default kind of asking questions. The widespread norm states that one inquires whether p only if one does not know that p. However, the fact that inquiring is just one kind of asking questions has received little to no attention. Just as in the declarative mood we can perform not only assertions, but various other speech acts, like guesses or predictions, so in the interrogative mood we can also make various (...) speech act types. I propose a speech-act-theoretic account of a distinct kind of question that I label exam questions. According to the proposed account, one performs an exam question p only if (i) one has access to the answer to p, and (ii) one does not officially know whether the hearer knows the answer to p. Exam questions satisfy all the necessary requirements of being a distinct kind of speech act. Additionally, my proposal contributes to the recent expansion of the normative approach to a variety of speech acts. (shrink)

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (...) (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion’s conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Turri’s (2015a) experimental study concerning selfless assertions is defective and should therefore be rejected. One performs a selfless assertion when one states something that one does not believe, and hence does not know, despite possessing well supported evidence to the contrary. Following his experimental study, Turri argues that agents in fact both believe and know the content of their selfless assertions. In response to this claim, I demonstrate that the conclusions he draws are premature (...) in this regard. More specifically, I criticize his methodology, showing that his study is not only incomplete but also yields contradictory results. In closing, I propose how such a study should be conducted in order to receive comprehensive results. (shrink)

The notion of so-called "postulated ontology" appears in the context of a well- -known thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data. It is argued in the paper, that the conviction of the existence of some kind of relation between a given theory and ontological ideas can be derived from this thesis, regardless of its particular form. Therefore, certain solutions to classical philosophical questions can be obtained, in principle, by careful inspection of scientific achievements. However, if the thesis (...) of underdetermination holds, such philosophical solutions are not imposed by science itself. In order to arrive at some kind of ontology based on science, it seems necessary to accept certain philosophical presuppositions in the first place. This, and the fact that scientific theories change in time show that although such a kind of ontology is possible, and perhaps desirable, it can never be ultimate. (shrink)

I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions (...) can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies. (shrink)

I argue against Milić's (2017) proposal of analyzing “selfless assertions” (Lackey 2007) as proper, i.e., as assertions which satisfy the norm of assertion. In his view, selfless assertions are hedged assertions governed by the knowledge norm. In my critique, I show that Milić does not make a case that selfless assertions constitute such a special class of assertions. Moreover, he does not deliver a clear criterion for differentiating between flat-out assertions and hedged ones. What is more, his proposal leaves some (...) cases of selfless assertions unexplained. The outcome is that we are still left without a satisfactory account of selfless assertions as proper assertions. (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic classification and characterization of speech acts and their norms. Recently, the normative approach has been applied to various speech acts, most notably to constatives. I start by showing how the work on the norms of assertion has influenced various approaches to the norms of other speech acts. I focus on the fact that various norms of assertion have different extensions, i.e., they denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to an assertion. I argue that this (...) has consequences for theorising about norms of other speech acts and generates certain arbitrary divisions. In the central part, I analyse two groups of speech acts. Firstly, ordinary speech acts, like predictions or retractions. Secondly, I indicate how the normative view can be extended to so-called ancillary speech acts, like presuppositions or implicatures. I end with a discussion of possible extensions of the normative approach, focusing on the debate on lying. (shrink)

Opracowanie ma charakter poglądowo-teoretyczny, powstało bowiem na podstawie przeglądu dostępnej literatury przedmiotu. Publikacja skierowana jest zarówno do naukowców jak i studentów zajmujących się tematyką starzenia się ludności, starości i osób starszych oraz do coraz szerszego grona zainteresowanych tymi zagadnieniami praktyków, w tym polityków i decydentów oraz reprezentantów usług publicznych, przedstawicieli mediów i organizacji pozarządowych. ** The study is illustrative and theoretical in nature, as it was based on a review of the available literature on the subject. The publication is addressed (...) to both scholars and students dealing with the subjects of population ageing, old age, and older adults, as well as to a growing group of practitioners interested in these issues, including politicians and decision-makers as well as representatives of public services, the media, and non-governmental organizations. (shrink)

This paper offers a normative account of the speech act of explanation with understanding as its norm. The previous accounts of the speech act of explanation rely on the factive notion of understanding and maintain that proper explanations require knowledge. I argue, however, that such accounts are too demanding and do not reflect the everyday practice of explanation and the attribution of understanding. Instead, I argue that the non-factive, objectual attitude of understanding is sufficient for a proper explanation. On the (...) normative level, explanations are governed by an audience-centred norm, i.e., they are sensitive to the epistemic position of the audience. According to the proposed account, an explanation is a communicative act in which one puts the audience in a position to understand the explained phenomenon. This proposal fits into the recent wave of applications of the normative account and makes space for the pluralism of illocutionary acts. (shrink)

Although assertions are often characterised as essentially informative speech acts, there is a widespread disagreement concerning how the informativeness of assertions should be understood. This paper proposes the informativeness norm of assertion, which posits that assertions are speech acts that essentially deliver new information. As a result, if one asserts something that is already commonly known, one’s assertion is improper. The norm is motivated by appealing to unique conversational patterns associated with informative and uninformative uses of assertions, an analogy between (...) assertions and inquiries, and a distinction between assertions and uninformative speech acts. By focusing on the normative approach to speech acts, the paper discusses how particular norms of assertion deal with the data supporting the norm of informativeness. To be informative, the speaker must consider the epistemic position of the audience. Since the majority of norms proposed in the literature are speaker-centred, they fail to explain the submitted data. Looking more broadly, focusing on the informativeness of assertions underscores the crucial role of the audience in construing adequate speech act accounts. (shrink)

The widely accepted view states that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. Proponents of this view, the so-called non-deceptionists, argue that lies are simply insincere assertions. We conducted three experimental studies with false explanations, the results of which put some pressure on non-deceptionist analyses. We present cases of explanations that one knows are false and compare them with analogical explanations that differ only in having a deceptive intention. The results show that lay people distinguish between such false (...) explanations and to a higher degree classify as lies those explanations that are made with the intention to deceive. Non-deceptionists fail to distinguish between such cases and wrongly classify both as lies. This novel empirical finding indicates the need for supplementing non-deceptionist definitions of lying, at least in some cases, with an additional condition, such as an intention to deceive. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 in (...) the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)

Science and valuation — remarks about the condition of philosophical re ection on science this text is an attempt at a more general look at twentieth‐century philosophical re ection on science conceived as persistent trials to eliminate the non‐eliminateable, i.e. valuations. In this article, I recall the most important concepts of knowledge developed in the twentieth‐century philosophy of science by exposing assumed axiology in, among other things: the Vienna Circle, Karl raimund Popper’s falsi cationism, the historical and social approach of (...) thomas S. Kuhn’s paradigm, and the concept of the ideals of knowledge by Stefan Amsterdamski. I argue that the axiology, and more broadly philosophy is an indelible com‐ ponent of each accepted concept of scienti c knowledge. each concept of knowledge assumes a form of its valuation. (shrink)

The paper remains and reinforces a viewpoint that science and religion (theology) are methodologically and epistemologically independent. However, it also suggests that this independence can be overcome if a "third party" is taken into account, that is - philosophy. Such possibility seems to follow from the thesis of incommensurability and the thesis of underdetermination formulated and analyzed in current philosophy of science.

This is a transcript of a conversation between P F Strawson and Gareth Evans in 1973, filmed for The Open University. Under the title 'Truth', Strawson and Evans discuss the question as to whether the distinction between genuinely fact-stating uses of language and other uses can be grounded on a theory of truth, especially a 'thin' notion of truth in the tradition of F P Ramsey.

Zasadnicza problematyka książki została podzielona na dwie części, uwzględniające tradycyjny podział na filozofię przyrody nieożywionej i filozofię przyrody ożywionej. Zastosowanie wspomnianego podziału jest uzasadnione zarówno charakterem bytów przyrodniczych, jak i dotychczasową literaturą przedmiotu. Te części poprzedzone zostały omówieniem zagadnień metodologicznych związanych z uprawianiem filozofii przyrody. Czwartą, dodatkową część publikacji, zatytułowaną Tajemnice przyrody, stanowią refleksje nad całością świata przyrodniczego ułożone w filozoficzny tryptyk: Przypadek, Cud, Sens. Są one próbą poszukiwania odpowiedzi na najbardziej podstawowe pytania, które pojawiają się na styku badań przyrodoznawstwa, (...) refleksji filozoficzno-przyrodniczej i teologii przyrody. (shrink)

In their insightful article, Brent Kious and Margaret Battin (2019) correctly identify an inconsistency between an involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid in dying (PAD). They declare that it may be possible to resolve the problem by articulating “objective standards for evaluating the severity of others’ suffering,” but ultimately they admit that this task is beyond the scope of their article since the solution depends on “a deep and difficult” question about comparing the worseness of two possible (...) scenarios: letting someone die (who could have been helped) with not letting someone die (whose suffering could only be alleviated by death). In our commentary, we argue that creating such standards is more difficult than the authors assume because of the many types of deep uncertainties we have to deal with: (1) diagnostic, (2) motivational, and (3) existential. (shrink)

This Research Topic focuses on the first Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) by the UN, which aims to “end poverty in all its forms everywhere.” Progress toward this goal is evaluated through various targets and indicators. The most recent SDG progress report highlighted how poverty reduction has significantly slowed and worsened, mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic (United Nations, 2024). This unprecedented emergency has particularly affected informal workers, young people, and women. With the goal of eradicating poverty by 2030 currently off (...) track, intensified action is crucial. Moreover, amid a growing climate crisis, significant efforts are needed to bring the 2030 targets within reach. This Research Topic examines SDG1 from a sociological perspective, focusing on its framing, geographic adaptations, stakeholder involvement, and the influence of social mobility and stratification studies, especially in the context of the challenges of the post-COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

While agreeing with the main conclusion of Dominic Wilkinson and colleagues (Wilkinson, Butcherine, and Savulescu 2019), namely, that there is no moral difference between treatment withholding and withdrawal as such, we wish to criticize their approach on the basis that it treats the widespread acceptance of withdrawal aversion (WA) as a cognitive bias. Wilkinson and colleagues understand WA as “a nonrational preference for withholding (WH) treatment over withdrawal (WD) of treatment” (22). They treat WA as a manifestation of loss aversion (...) and refer to Kahneman and colleagues (1991), which defined this effect as follows: “the disutility of giving up an object is greater that the utility associated with acquiring it” (194). In a previous work, Wilkinson and Savulescu understood nonequivalence between treatment withholding and withdrawal as a reflection of slightly different, although related, phenomena: status quo bias or omission bias (Wilkinson and Savulescu 2012, 130–131). In neither of these two papers do they describe precisely the relation between these well-known psychological effects and WA, nor do they explain why they treat these effects as examples of nonrational preferences, despite the fact that these issues have been the subject of wide-ranging discussions on the intersection of psychology, economy, and philosophy. (shrink)

Tendencja do zmniejszenia kosztów produkcji przez firmy działające na międzynarodowym rynku dotyka również reklamy. Międzynarodowe przedsiębiorstwa, chcąc ograniczyć wydatki na reklamę w poszczególnych krajach, decydują się coraz częściej na stosowanie tej samej reklamy w mniej lub bardziej zmienionej formie w różnych krajach, nie bacząc przy tym na istniejące między tymi krajami różnice kulturowe. Prezentowany artykuł wykazał, że istnieje wiele czynników, które należy uwzględnić w reklamie międzynarodowej, a których znajomość pozwala na podwyższenie jej efektywności w istotny sposób. Różnice między reklamą narodową (...) a międzynarodową dotyczą przede wszystkim czynników politycznych, gospodarczych i socjalnych, które wytyczają normy prawne, wpływają na wybór odpowiedniej strategii reklamy oraz wskazują na sposób zachowania konsumentów. Istotny wpływ na sukces reklamy międzynarodowej ma również dostrzeżenie różnic w nastawieniu do reklamy i jej postrzeganiu przez poszczególne społeczeństwa, wynikające z przynależności do innych kręgów kulturowych, które determinują myślenie i zachowanie jednostek. Każda kultura wykształciła swój własny system wartości i przywiązuje różną wagę do emocji. Mimo używania tych samych środków komunikacji w formie języka i obrazu znaki werbalne i wizualne jednej kultury nie zawsze mają swe wierne odpowiedniki w innej kulturze, mogą bowiem różnić się między sobą wywoływanymi skojarzeniami i konotacjami. Reklama międzynarodowa może być skuteczna we wszystkich krajach jedynie wtedy, jeśli uwzględni wspomniane różnice między poszczególnymi kulturami i dostosuje się na ich podstawie do specyfiki każdego rynku zbytu. Najlepszym rozwiązaniem dla reklamy międzynarodowej jest tym samym dążenie do maksymalnej standardyzacji reklamy przy jednoczesnym uwzględnieniu niezbędnych dyferencji kulturowych. (shrink)

This Research Topic explores the ninth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), which aims to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation, particularly in the context of post-COVID-19 pandemic recovery. The pandemic significantly impacted the manufacturing sector, leading to a global production drop, job losses, and disrupted supply chains, with less technology-intensive industries taking longer to regain ground. Despite these challenges, the United Nations highlights opportunities to enhance industrialization and technology distribution, emphasizing, among other things, the need to (...) expand mobile broadband networks, increase research and development investment, and improve rural road connectivity. (shrink)

Reklama jako sztuka perswazji wykorzystuje obecnie każdą technikę i każdy środek w celu zwiększenia swego wpływu na potencjalnego konsumenta. Ważnym aspektem reklamy są tzw. słowa-klucze (Schlüsselwörter), które ze względu na swą semantykę wywołują różnorodne pozytywne konotacje i skojarzenia. Słowa te transportują pewne wartości, które zostają przez konsumenta przenoszone na reklamowany produkt, co przyczynia się do zwiększenia wartości danego produktu w oczach konsumenta. Analizie poddano 100 tekstów reklamowych, które ukazały się w prasie niemieckiej w latach 2001-2002. Słowa-klucze zostały wyodrębniane osobno z (...) czterech grup tekstów reklamowych w zależności od reklamowanego produktu: leki, biżuteria, kosmetyki, samochody. W prezentowanym artykule wykazano, że użycie słów-kluczy zależy od reklamowanego produktu, co związane jest z reprezentowanymi przez te słowa różnymi wartościami i wywoływanymi przez nie różnymi konotacjami i skojarzeniami. W reklamie leków największą rolę odgrywają takie wartości jak skuteczność i naturalność, które spełniają w pełni oczekiwania konsumenta co do stosowania reklamowanych leków. Reklamy biżuterii podkreślają trwałość, tradycję i kosztowność produktów, dzięki czemu odnoszą się do emocji konsumentów i podkreślają ich status społeczny. Reklama samochodów kieruje uwagę konsumenta na bezpieczeństwo, technikę i komfort reklamowanych pojazdów, co podkreśla dostosowanie się do głównych potrzeb kupującego. Reklamy kosmetyków zachwalają natomiast swe produkty takimi określeniami, jak pielęgnacja, efektywność i skuteczność. Wspomniane słowa-klucze wskazują bezpośrednio lub poprzez skojarzenia i konotacje różne wartości, które odgrywają istotną rolę w danym społeczeństwie. Poprzez podświadome przeniesienie tych wartości na reklamowany produkt potencjalny konsument nie dokonuje zakupu określonego produktu, lecz postrzega ten produkt przez pryzmat związanych w nim wartości i decyduje się na kupno, jeśli dane wartości spełniają jego potrzeby. W wyniku powyższych rozważań można stwierdzić, iż konsument nie kupuje jedynie materialnego produktu, który dla konsumenta tylko w nieistotny sposób różni się od innych produktów tego samego rodzaju, ale wartości przekazywane przez reklamę pod postacią słów-kluczy. (shrink)

Heated debates stemming from the confrontation of scientific knowledge with the biblical picture of the creation of man, which had followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution, became far less prominent in the second half of the 20th century. This was due to two factors: first, the theory of evolution was partly accepted in theological circles and at the same time biologists showed a growing awareness of the limited epistemological scope of the competence of the natural sciences. This lesson (...) from the history, however, seems to have been forgotten by many who now and again return to controversies which more often than not are caused by ideological quarrels over religion, with true scholarship being too easily lost from sight. The paper reminds some of the history of the controversy in question and suggests that at least some of the current problems regarding evolution˗and˗ creation controversy may have already found their solutions. In part 1, “The Theory of Evolution and the Creation of the Human” it deals with the general issue of human origins. In part 2, “Monogenism and Original Sin” it explores the notion of the ‘first human’ as it is employed in biology and in theology, and shows its completely different meaning in these two realms of knowledge which helps to resolve the recurrent controversy over monogenism. (shrink)

The monograph contains three works on research on the concept of a rejected sentence. This research, conducted under the supervision of Prof. Jerzy Słupecki by U. Wybraniec-Skardowska (1) "Theory of rejected sentences" and G. Bryll (2) "Some supplements of theory of rejected sentences" and (3) "Logical relations between sentences of empirical sciences" led to the construction of a theory rejected sentences and made it possible to formalize certain issues in the methodology of empirical sciences. The concept of a rejected sentence (...) was introduced by J. Łukasiewicz in the course of his inquiry into Aristotelian Syllogistic. It was essentialy generelized by J. Słupecki who, with reference to Tarski's axiomatic theory of deductive systems (1930), gave the formal definition of the rejection function Cn' according to which a sentence y is rejected on the base of a set of sentences X iff at least one sentence which belongs to X can be deduced from the sentence y. Słupecki proved (1959) that the function Cn', which assignes to the set X the set of sentences rejected on the basis of X, is additive and satisfies the axioms of Tarski's general theory of deductive systems. Work (1) uses not only Tarski's general theory of systems but also his the so-called enlarged theory of systems (1930). It constructs a theory T of rejected sentences (propositions), which is created from Tarski's richer theory of systems by adding one axiom and a number of definitions; among them the definition of the rejection function Cn' is fundamental one. Cn' is a function which assignes to every set X of false sentences the set Cn'X whose members are exclusively false senteces. A number of theorems which describes properties of defined concepts have been proved in T. Some of them are necessary for conducting considertions of the concluding section of (1) devoted to the empirical sentences. Section 2 of (1) deals with the theory of the unit consequenses. It is characterized by an axiom from which follow all axioms of Tarski's general theory of deductive systems, additivity and the property that the unit consequence of the set X of sentences is a unit consequence only one sentence of X. An example of unit consequence is the rejection consequence Cn'. In section 3 of (1) the dual theory T' equivalent to T is presented. In T' the primitive concept is the rejection function Cn'. The fundamental axiom of T' states that Cn' is a unit consequence. The concluding section brings a few examples of applications of the definitions and theorems of T in the domain of the scientific methodology. Work (2) corresonds to J. Słupecki paper (1959) and the theory T of rejected propositions given in work (1). In this paper some suplements of the theory T are given. Work (3) is an extension of the theory of rejected propositios given in the paper (1). It is an attempt of formalization some problems of methodology of the empirical sciences which concern to such concepts as: empirical sentence, similar sentence, generalization, inductive conclusion etc. (shrink)

Pada musim semi, entah kenapa, tidak banyak ikan. Karena tangkapannya sangat tidak stabil, Pekakak mulai berpikir. Lalu membuat beberapa rencana. Dengan otoritas komandonya, dia memanggil Bangau: – Ini adalah musim penangkapan ikan yang sangat sulit. Jika kita ingin kenyang, kita harus membuat usaha patungan. Bangau mengangguk, menambahkan: - Saya setuju; mari kita beternak ikan kakap putih dan ikan mas krusia. Jenis ini berumur panjang dan sangat produktif. Pekakak dan Bangau sepakat untuk berbagi tugas beternak, dan tidak ada diskriminasi yang diizinkan. (...) Namun imbalannya berbeda: Pekakak bertanggung jawab untuk ikan kakap putih dan, dengan demikian, dapat memiliki lebih banyak ikan kakap putih, sedangkan Bangau mendapat ikan mas krusia. Siapapun yang memelihara ikan mana yang lebih banyak akan menikmati 80% dari panen akhir ikan tersebut. Keduanya akan mengevaluasi dan membagi produk ternak pada akhir musim beternak. Ini berarti mengantongi sendiri ikan hasil usaha patungan untuk diri sendiri itu dilarang. (shrink)

Suatu pagi di musim panas, desa burung diselimuti keheningan. Semua orang sibuk mendengarkan pengembara baru. Burung pengembara ini berasal dari keluarga yang tidak jelas; bulunya berwarna-warni, gerak-geriknya lucu, dan ilmunya baru. Dia bercerita seolah-olah sedang memberi ceramah, tepat sekali, warga desa memanggilnya burung Guru – orang yang menjawab setiap pertanyaan aneh warga desa yang rajin belajar. Burung pelatuk telah belajar menangkap cacing di sore hari, sehingga mereka tidak perlu bangun pagi. Burung pipit sekarang tahu cara mencuri beras dari gudang saat (...) sawah mulai kering. Bulbul, sementara itu, telah mengambil kesempatan berkumpul untuk memamerkan kecantikan dan fashion mereka… . (shrink)

Pekakak selama ini tinggal di gua galiannya sendiri di tepi kolam, tapi sekarang dia memutuskan bahwa dia membutuhkan rumah baru. Dia melakukan tur keliling desa untuk melihat bagaimana burung-burung lain membangun rumah mereka. Dia mengunjungi Tuan Pipit, yang tinggal di pohon pinus yang bersiul. Bagian depan bangunannya tampak indah, dan lokasinya yang tinggi memberikan ventilasi yang baik. Tapi, semakin lama dia menginap, dia jadi semakin pusing. Hembusan angin apa pun yang menerpa membuat seluruh struktur bangunan bergetar seolah-olah akan hancur berantakan.

The problem considered in this chapter emerges from the tension we find when looking at the design and architecture of chatbots on the one hand and their conversational aptitude on the other. In the way that LLM chatbots are designed and built, we have good reason to suppose they don't possess second-order capacities such as intention, belief or knowledge. Yet theories of conversation make great use of second-order capacities of speakers and their audiences to explain how aspects of interaction succeed. (...) As we can all bear witness to now though, at the point of use chatbots appear capable of performing language tasks at a level close to that of humans. This creates a tension when we consider something like, for example, the classic Gricean theory of implicature. On a broad summary of this type of account, to utter p and implicate q requires the reflexive occurrence of an audience supposing a speaker believes that q, and the speaker believing that their audience can determine they believe it when they utter p. So taken at face value, if a chatbot doesn’t have the capacity for belief, then either in their role as speaker or audience, they would not seem capable of either generating or comprehending implicatures. Yet on the surface it does seem that chatbots are capable of dealing with (some) implicatures, and as such it raises questions about how we should then correlate this with what we think occurs in cases of implicature with chatbots. (shrink)

The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken as a defining natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but instead as (...) providing the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds. (shrink)

Obóz Kultury 2.0 Mirosław Filiciak, Alek Tarkowski, Agata Jałosińska, Andrzej Klimczuk, Maciej Rynarzewski, Jacek Seweryn, Stunża M., D. Grzegorz, Marcin Wilkowski & Anna Orlik .

Migrating legacy database applications to modern cloud-based solutions, such as Snowflake, is becoming essential for organizations aiming to leverage scalable, efficient, and cost-effective data solutions. Legacy databases, typically bound to on-premises infrastructure, often lack the flexibility required by contemporary data analytics and storage needs. Snowflake, a cloud-native data platform, provides a versatile environment that enables efficient data storage, sharing, and processing. This research examines a structured methodology for migrating legacy database applications to Snowflake, addressing key stages from initial assessment to (...) data transformation, integration, and performance optimization. A systematic, step-by-step migration process is implemented to minimize risks, reduce downtime, and ensure data integrity. (shrink)

There is a history of thinking that photographs provide a special kind of access to the objects depicted in them, beyond the access that would be provided by a painting or drawing. What is included in the photograph does not depend on the photographer’s beliefs about what is in front of the camera. This feature leads Kendall Walton to argue that photographs literally allow us to see the objects which appear in them. Current generative algorithms produce images in response to (...) users’ text prompts. Depending on the parameters, the output can resemble specific people or things which are named in the prompt. This resemblance does not depend on the user’s beliefs, so generated images are in this sense like photographs. Given this parallel, how should we think about AI-generated images? (shrink)

Cloud storage's scalability, accessibility, and affordability have made it essential in the digital age. Data security and privacy remain a major issue due to the large volume of sensitive data kept on cloud services. Traditional encryption is safe but slows data recovery, especially for keyword searches. Secure, fine-grained access control and quick keyword searches over encrypted data are possible using attribute-based keyword search (ABKS). This study examines how ABKS might optimize search efficiency and data security in cloud storage systems. We (...) examine index compression, query processing improvement, and encryption optimization to decrease computational cost and preserve security. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world (...) and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do ensaio "Freedom and Resentment”, de P. F. Strawson. Publicado originalmente em Proceedings of the British Academy, v. 48, 1960. Republicado em Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Londres: Methuen, 1974. [Routledge, 2008, p. 2-28]. Publicado na coletânea: Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson: com a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual. Organizadores: Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luís Gelain. Editora da UFSC, 2015. ISBN: 9788532807250.

Tradução para o português do ensaio "Social Morality and Individual Ideal”. Publicado originalmente em Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, vol. XXXVI, n. 136, p. 1-17, Jan. 1961. Republicado em: STRAWSON, P. F. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Londres: Methuen, 1974. [Routledge, 2008, p. 26-44]. ]. Publicado na coletânea: Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson: com a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual. Organizadores: Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luís Gelain. Editora da (...) UFSC, 2015. ISBN: 9788532807250. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do livro "Ceticismo e naturalismo: algumas variedades", Strawson, P. F. . São Leopoldo, RS: Editora da Unisinos, 2008, 114 p. Coleção: Ideias. ISBN: 9788574313214. Capítulo 1 - Ceticismo, naturalismo e argumentos transcendentais 1. Notas introdutórias; 2. Ceticismo tradicional; 3. Hume: Razão e Natureza; 4. Hume e Wittgenstein; 5. “Apenas relacionar”: O papel dos argumentos transcendentais; 6. Três citações; 7. Historicismo: e o passado.

How should we respond to the humanity of others? Should we care for others’ well-being? Respect them as autonomous agents? Largely neglected is an answer we can find in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism: we should love all. This paper argues that an ideal of love for all can be understood apart from its more typical religious contexts and moreover provides a unified and illuminating account of the the nature and grounds of morality. I defend a novel (...) account of love for all that avoids serious worries about the incoherence or impossibility of loving everyone. Doing so requires countenancing a neglected form of love. Love admits as its object not just individual entities like people and groups; we can also bear a love for the Fs in general---for all the Joneses, all the philosophers, or even all the human beings. I go on to argue that while it is possible for ordinary agents like us to love all, we shouldn't. Instead, we should approximate love for all. The minimal approximation of love for all is, surprisingly, respect; I derive the basic, structural features of deontological ethics (including anti-paternalism and anti-aggregation) from the ideal of loving all. (NB: This paper used to be titled "Ethics in the Shadow of Love" and has been cited as an unpublished manuscript under that title.). (shrink)

forall x: Calgary is a full-featured textbook on formal logic. It covers key notions of logic such as consequence and validity of arguments, the syntax of truth-functional propositional logic TFL and truth-table semantics, the syntax of first-order (predicate) logic FOL with identity (first-order interpretations), symbolizing English in TFL and FOL, and Fitch-style natural deduction proof systems for both TFL and FOL. It also deals with some advanced topics such as modal logic, soundness, and functional completeness. Exercises with solutions are available. (...) It is provided in PDF (for screen reading, printing, and a special version for dyslexics), HTML, and in LaTeX source code. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to 18 of the essays on panpsychism in this issue. Along the way, I sketch out what a post-Galilean science of consciousness, one in which consciousness is taken to be a fundamental feature of reality, might look like.

I've previously suggested that the historical evidence used to challenge scientific realism should lead us to embrace what I call Uniformitarianism, but many recently influential forms of scientific realism seem happy to share this commitment. I trace a number of further points of common ground that collectively constitute an appealing Middle Path between classical forms of realism and instrumentalism, and I suggest that many contemporary realists and instrumentalists have already become fellow travelers on this Middle Path without recognizing how far (...) they have thereby diverged from those who share their labels and slogans. I conclude by describing their central remaining disagreement and the sorts of evidence needed to resolve it. (shrink)